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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Unlawful Detainer-Set-off's & Counterclaims. In Young v. Riley'
the Washington Supreme Court cited a broken line of decisions, called
them "unbroken," and held that set-off's and counterclaims cannot be
adjudicated in unlawful detainer actions.
On June 17, 1960, Maude Riley was delinquent in the payment of
her rent for May and June. She received the statutory notice' to pay
rent or vacate within three days, from her landlord, Marta Young.
Four days later she notified her landlord that the rent would be with-
held in order to cover damages resulting from the disturbance of her
possession through occupancy of a portion of the leased premises by
the landlord and her minor daughter.
The landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, seeking judg-
ment for double' rent and restoration of the premises. In her answer
the tenant pleaded the disturbance of possession and counterclaimed
for thirty-five hundred dollars, a sum exceeding the amount of rent due.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's determination that the
tenant was not in default of rent, and said that the lower court's judg-
ment "completely ignore[d] the purpose of the statutory action for
unlawful detainer, which is to preserve the peace."' The court then
stated:
The statute affords a summary remedy for obtaining possession of
property withheld by tenants who fail to pay rent within three days
after the service of statutory notice.... The right and remedy alike
are statutory, and the procedural remedy is an integral part of the right
itself. RCW 59.12. In an unlawful detainer action, the court sits as a
special statutory tribunal to summarily decide the issues authorized
1159 Wash. Dec. 55, 365 P.2d 769 (1961).
2 RCW 59.12.030 "Unlawful detainer defined. A tenant of real property for a term
less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer either: .... (3) When he continues in pos-
session in person or by subtenant after a default in the payment of rent, and after notice
in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the
detained premises, served (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the
person entitled to the rent upon the person owing it, has remained uncomplied with for
the period of three days after service thereof. The notice may be served at any time
after the rent becomes due...."
3RCW 59.12.170 "Judgment-Execution. If upon the trial the verdict of the jury or,
if the case be tried without a jury, the finding of the court be in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, judgment shall be entered for the restitution of the premises;
and if the proceeding be for unlawful detainer... after default in the payment of rent,
the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease agreement or tenancy. Thejury, or the court, if the proceedings be tried without a jury, shall also assess the
damages occasioned to the plaintiff ... and, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after
default in the payment of rent, find the amount of any rent due, and the judgment shall
be rendered against the defendant ... for twice the amount of damages thus assessed
and of the rent, if any, found due....!4 Young v. Riley, 159 Wash. Dec. 55, 56, 365 P.2d 769, 771 (1961).
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by statute and not as a court of general jurisdiction with the power to
hear and determine other issues.... RCW 59.12.170 provides that,
upon a finding of default in the payment of rent, ". . the judgment shall
also declare the forfeiture of the lease, agreement or tenancy.. .. "
It is settled by an unbroken line of decisions that in such proceeding
the defendant may not assert a set-off or counterclaim.5
This "unbroken line of decisions" denying the tenant a set-off or
counterclaim in unlawful detainer proceedings, began in 1891 with
Ralph v. Lomer.6 Subsequent cases through 1909 asserted this same
proposition and said that a tenant's only remedy is to bring an inde-
pendent action for breach of covenant.'
The first break in the "unbroken line of decisions" occurred in
Andersonian Inv. Co. v. Wade,' in 1919. In discussing the availability
of equitable defenses in unlawful detainer proceedings, the court said:
We cannot conclude, therefore, that a defendant in an unlawful detainer
action can in no case present an equitable defense; his right to do so,
we think, must depend upon the acts which give rise to the action.
If he acquires possession lawfully and it is sought to oust him because
of his subsequent acts, he may defend by setting up any defense which
will justify his act.9
The court's willingness to allow any equitable defense is an extension
of prior Washington cases,1" which involve unlawful detainer actions
premised upon either breach of covenants or holding over by the tenant
after termination of his tenancy.' While these cases consistently
sIbid. The court cited these cases in support of not allowing set-off's or counter-
claims: Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wn.2d 27, 216 P.2d 228 (1950) ; Chung v. Louie
Fong Co., 130 Wash. 154, 226 Pac. 726 (1924); Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, No.
6, F. & A. M., 8 Wash. 529, 36 Pac. 476 (1894); Ralph v. Lomer, 3 Wash. 401, 28 Pac.
760 (1891).
6 3 Wash. 401, 28 Pac. 760 (1891).
7 Hutchinson v. Wilson, 54 Wash. 410, 103 Pac. 474 (1909) ; Owens v. Swanton, 25
Wash. 112, 64 Pac. 921 (1901) ; Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, No. 6, F. & A. M.,
8 Wash. 529, 36 Pac. 476 (1894).
8 108 Wash. 373, 184 Pac. 327 (1919).
9Id. at 378-79, 184 Pac. at 330.
10 Hutchinson Inv. Co. v. Van Nostern, 99 Wash. 549, 170 Pac. 121 (1918) (Tenant
allowed to prove no nuisance, and thus no breach of covenant. He failed.) ; Northcraft
v. Blumauer, 53 Wash. 243, 101 Pac. 871 (1909) (defense of no breach and part per-
formance defense to remove oral lease from Statute of Frauds) ; Watldns v. Balch, 41
Wash. 310, 83 Pac. 321 (1906) (part performance) ; Teater v. King, 35 Wash. 138, 76
Pac. 688 (1904) (proved valid lease) ; Brown v. Baruch, 24 Wash. 572, 64 Pac. 789
(1901) (estoppel).
11 RCW 59.12.030 "Unlawful detainer defined. A tenant of real property for a term
less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer either: (1) When he holds over or con-
tinues in possession... of the property.., after the expiration of the term for which it
is let to him.... (2) When he, having leased property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved, continues in possession ... after the end of any
such month or period, when the landlord, more than twenty days prior to the end of
such month or period, has served notice... requiring him to quit the premises at the
[VOL. 37
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allowed the tenant to assert the equitable defenses of estoppel or part
performance, the cases cited in Young just as consistently refused to
allow the equitable defense12 of set-off in an unlawful detainer action
premised upon nonpayment of rent' 3 The Andersonian decision seems
to abolish the inconsistency.
In 1930, the major break in the "unbroken line of decisions" oc-
curred. In Income Properties Inv. Corp. v. Trelethen,4 the court cited
the Andersonian case and allowed a tenant to recoup his damages for
the landlord's breach of a covenant to repair. The unlawful detainer
action had been commenced because the tenant, claiming an offset for
the landlord's breach, refused to pay rent. Thereafter the tenant
brought a bill in equity to restrain the landlord's action, so long as the
alleged damages exceeded the amount of rent due. The two actions
were consolidated for trial. The court found the tenant's remedy at
law to be inadequate, and that the landlord was seeking only a forfei-
ture, which equity abhors. The court said: "It is well settled that,
when the conditions and circumstances are such as to warrant the inter-
ference of equity, equity will assume jurisdiction for all purposes and
give such relief as may be required." 5 The court then affirmed the
trial court decree enjoining the unlawful detainer action, or any action
which would lead to a forfeiture until the landlord performed his part
of the lease contract.
While the Income Properties case is procedurally distinguishable
from the prior cases cited, it does permit a tenant to withhold rent when
his landlord has breached covenants in the lease contract, subject only
to the requirement that the amount of alleged damages exceed the
amount of rent due. With the premise established, this conclusion
follows. In an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent, the
court will allow, as an affirmative equitable defense, the tenant's claim
that his default in rent is justified because the landlord has breached a
covenant.
The soundness of such an extension of the Income Properties case
expiration of such month or period.... (4) When he continues in possession ... after a
neglect or failure to keep or perform any other condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement... than one for the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in
the alternative the performance of such condition or covenant or the surrender of the
property ... shall remain uncomplied with for ten days after service thereof...."
22 On equitable and statutory set-off, see 3 STORY, EQuiTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1866
(14 ed. 1918), and Clark & Surbeck, The Pleading of Counterclaims, 37 YA.LE L.J. 300
(1927).
13 See cases cited note 7 supra.
"-1155 Wash. 493, 284 Pac. 782 (1930).
'5 Id. at 506, 284 Pac. at 786.
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has not been established. A dictum in Woodward v. Blanchett0 sup-
ports the old rule. The Income Properties case is not mentioned. The
Young case also did not settle the issue, because the Income Properties
decision was not cited to the court in respondent's brief and is not
mentioned in the decision.
If the Income Properties case had been presented in Young v. Riley,
the court could have used either of two reasons for not following it.
First, the weight of authority supports the prior decisions in Wash-
ington. Professor Williston has stated the general rule as follows:
If the lease or a statute, as is usually the case, allows a landlord to
eject a tenant for non-payment of his rent, the landlord may pursue
this remedy, and it cannot be said that the tenant has paid or tendered
the rent due if he has deducted even a valid crossclaim. 7
Second, the willingness of equity to prevent a forfeiture in that case
is against the weight of authority. The general rule is that a stipulation
in a lease allowing re-entry and forfeiture for nonpayment of rent is
deemed mere security for the payment of rent. Whenever the other can
be made whole by the payment of rents and interest, equity will relieve
against forfeiture."8 However, an exception exists in the unlawful de-
tainer action. When the statute provides a specific period of time during
which the tenant may pay his rent and avoid forfeiture, equity will not
give relief after such time has run. 9 The reason is that forfeiture is
imposed by statute and granting relief after the statutory grace period
would "contravene the express will of the legislature. 2 0 The Wash-
ington unlawful detainer statute gives the tenant three days in which to
pay all arrears in rent and thus completely protect himself from for-
feiture.2' After the three days have elapsed, equity will not give relief. 22
The Washington statute also provides a period of five days after the
judgment is entered during which the tenant, by fully satisfying the
16 36 Wn.2d 27, 216 P.2d 228 (1950).
11 3 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS § 887 F at 2507 (rev. ed. 1936), citing among many
cases, Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, No. 6, F. & A. M., 8 Wash. 529, 26 Pac. 476
(1894). See note 5 supra.
183 STORY, Fqury JURiSPRUDENCE § 1727 (14 ed. 1918). D. Paradis Co. v. North
Hudson Holding Co., 137 N.J.Eq. 430, 45 A2d 323 (1946).
19 New Mexico Motor Corp. v. Bliss, 27 N.M. 304, 201 Pac. 105 (1921) ; Rainey v.
Quigley, 180 Ore. 554, 178 P.2d 148 (1947) ; Ralph v. Lomer, 3 Wash. 401, 28 Pac. 760(1891) ; Herman v. Kennard Buick Co., 5 Wis. 2d 480, 93 N.W2d 340 (1958).
20 Note, Real Property-Tenant's Right To Relief From Forfeiture For Non-payment
of Rent, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 741, 743.
21 RCW 59.12.030 (3). See note 2 supra.
222 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 274 d(7) (1910).
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judgment, can be restored to his estate.23 The Wisconsin court has
refused to restrain enforcement of an unlawful detainer judgment be-
cause the tenant failed to avail himself of a similar grace period (ten
days)."' The Washington statute also contains a provision permitting
discretionary relief from forfeiture within thirty days after the entry of
judgment, upon proper application to the court.2"
While the Income Properties case stands against the weight of au-
thority, the argument supporting its basic precept is perhaps of equal
persuasiveness. As stated in the Young case, the action of unlawful
detainer is designed to afford the landlord a summary remedy for ob-
taining possession after a default in the payment of rent. As evidenced
by the varied statutory provisions enabling the tenant to avoid forfei-
ture, the purpose of the statute is to force prompt payment of the rent
by threatening forfeiture. The primary interest being protected is the
landlord's interest in seasonable receipt of his expected income, not his
interest in regaining possession shortly after a default in rent payments.
Is not the landlord's interest in prompt receipt of the rental income
adequately safeguarded by a scheme giving him the benefit of the
coercive power of the unlawful detainer statute, but subject to the
condition that he has reasonably fulfilled and performed his duties
under the lease contract? In other contracts with independent condi-
tions, the parties are still able to bargain effectively in seeing that the
other performs his duties. While no conditions precedent to a suit may
exist, a potential counterclaim can have the effect of forcing each to
duly discharge his duties under the contract. But in the unlawful
detainer situation, failure to pay rent within the three-day period will
result in forfeiture or double damages or both.
The landlord has ample coercive power, the speedy summary pro-
ceeding. The tenant can only threaten a separate suit for breach of
covenants, a less effective remedy because of the time element and the
continuing duty to make all rent payments. The crucial question thus
becomes: Does the landlord need and deserve such protection? Should
the unwary tenant who withholds rent in order to force the landlord to
repair or perform other covenants be told not only that he must resort
23 RCW 59.12.170 "Judgment-Execution.... When the proceeding is for an unlawful
detainer after default in the payment of rent, and the lease or agreement under which
the rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not
be issued until the expiration of five days after the entry of the judgment, within which
time the tenant... may pay into court... the amount of the judgment and costs, and
thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied and the tenant restored to his estate...24 Herman v. Kennard Buick Co., 5 Wis. 2d 480, 93 N.W.2d 340 (1958).
25 RCW 59.12.190 "Relief against forfeiture."
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to a separate action, but also that he forfeits his lease unless he can
pay the double damages within the statutory grace period?
Perhaps for the above reasons, the New York Legislature has ex-
pressly provided for counterclaims in unlawful detainer proceedings."
As in Washington, it is a summary proceeding governed entirely by
statute." Either legal or equitable defenses may be used," allowing the
tenant to counterclaim for his landlord's breach of covenant."' The
establishment of a counterclaim in excess of the amount of rent due,
purges the default and is a complete defense."
The District of Columbia has a similar statute." Whenever posses-
sion is sought for nonpayment of rent, the tenant may assert any
counterclaim or equitable defense sufficient to defeat the claim for
rent. 2 Arkansas has a general counterclaim statute,"' and it has been
construed to permit counterclaims in unlawful detainer actions."
The significant departures from the majority position in the United
States have been accomplished by legislation. This does not necessarily
mean that only the legislature can or should permit set-off's and coun-
terclaims in unlawful detainer actions. The remedy is a legislative
creation, but in the absence of an express prohibition of set-off's and
counterclaims, the court could construe the statute to allow them'
26 N.Y. Crvm PPAcTrcE AcT § 1410 (supp. 1961). "When tenant may be removed.
In either of the following cases, a tenant... of real property... may be removed there-
from, as prescribed in this article: .... 2. Where he holds over... after a default in the
payment of rent ... and a demand of the rent has been made, or at least three days'
notice in writing requiring, in the alternative, the payment of the rent; or the possession
of the premises, has been served ... " § 1425. "Answer. Judgment for rent due....
[T]he person ... may answer... denying generally the allegations,... or setting forth
a statement of any new matter constituting a legal or equitable defense, or counter-
claim. Such defense or counterclaim may be set up and established in like manner as
though the claim for rent in such proceeding was the subject of an action .... If the
court finds that a defense or counterclaim has been established in whole or in part, it
shall, upon rendering a final order, determine the amount of rent due to the petitioner...
and may give affirmative judgment for the amount found to be due on the counter-
claim."27 Liberty Place Holding Corp. v. Adolf Schwob, Inc., 136 Misc. 405, 241 N.Y. Supp.
438 (App. Div. 1930).2 8 Magnotta v. Parkway Fleetwood Bldg., Inc., 277 App. Div. 896, 98 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1950).
29 240 West Thirty-Seventh St Co. v. Lippman, 21 App. Div. 529, 272 N.Y. Supp.
739 (1934).30 Fenai , Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
a' D.C.CoDE ANN. § 13-214 (1961). "Equitable defenses in actions at law. In all
actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by plea or replication."
32 Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499 (Mun. Ct App. D.C. 1954). Lalekos v. Man-
set, 47 A2d 617 (Mun. Ct App. D.C. 1946).
3s ARx. STAT. ANN. § 27-1123 (1947). "Counterclaim defined. The counterclaim
mentioned in this chapter... may be any cause of action in favor of the defendants, or
some of them against the plaintiffs or some of them."
34 Smith v. Glover, 135 Ark. 531, 205 S.W. 891 (1918).
35 On the propriety of the court considering the social need manifested by legislation in
other jurisdictions, see CAnozo, THE NATuaR OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss, 98-141 (1921).
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The present Washington case law is inconsistent concerning such a
construction. The Income Properties case indicates a willingness by the
court to exercise its inherent equitable powers and thus accomplish
what was done in New York by statute. Young v. Riley does not over-
rule Income Properties, but does take a contrary position. The prece-
dential value of Young is only greater because of its more recent origin.
Whether it implicitly overrules Income Properties remains to be deter-
mined if and when both cases are argued to the court.
EvAw L. SciwA
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Sanctions for Enforcement of Discovery-Constitutionality of
Rule 37. The Washington Supreme Court recently heard Mitchell v.
Watson,1 a case of first impression concerning the interpretation, ap-
plication, and constitutionality of Rule of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure 37.2 The principles derived from the decision have an im-
1158 Wash. Dec. 194, 361 P2d 744 (1961).
aWAsH. RPPP 37: "Refusal to make discovery: Consequences, (a) Refusal to
Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question propounded upon
oral examination, the examination shall be completed on other matters or adjourned, as
the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all
persons affected thereby, he may apply to the court in the county where the deposition
is taken for an order compelling an answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or upon the refusal of a party to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the proponent of the question may on
like notice make like application for such an order. If the motion is granted, and if
the court finds that the refusal was without substantial justification the court shall
require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal
or either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is
denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without substantial justification,
the court shall require the examining party or the attorney advising the motion or both
of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(b) Failure to Comply with Order. (1) Contempt. If a party or other witness
refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by
the court in the county in which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be
considered a contempt of that court.
"(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to
answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document
or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be donej or
to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders
in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
"(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked or the
character or description of the thing or land or the contents of the paper, or the physical
or mental condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order;
"(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
19621
